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ABSTRACT 
We conduct a study in which subjects trade stocks in an experimental market while we measure 
their brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging. All of the subjects trade in a 
suboptimal way. We use the neural data to test a “realization utility” explanation for their 
behavior. We find that activity in two areas of the brain that are important for economic decision-
making exhibit activity consistent with the predictions of realization utility. These results provide 
support for the realization utility model. More generally, they demonstrate that neural data can be 
helpful in testing models of investor behavior. 
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Over the past twenty years, economists have accumulated a large amount of evidence on how 
individual investors manage their financial portfolios over time. Some of this evidence is 
puzzling, in the sense that it is hard to reconcile with the simplest models of rational trading 
(Barberis and Thaler (2003), Campbell (2006)). Theorists have responded to this challenge by 
constructing new models of investor behavior. Empiricists, in turn, have started testing these 
newly-developed models. 
Most of the empirical work that tests theories of investor behavior uses field data (Barber 
and Odean (2000), Barber and Odean (2001), Choi et al. (2009), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)). 
A smaller set of studies uses data from laboratory experiments. The advantage of experiments is 
that they give researchers a large degree of control over the trading and information environment, 
which can make it easier to tease theories apart (Plott and Sunder (1988), Camerer and Weigelt 
(1991), Camerer and Weigelt (1993), Weber and Camerer (1998), Bossaerts and Plott (2004), 
Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame (2007)). 
In this paper, we argue that another kind of data, namely measures of neural activity 
taken using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects trade in an 
experimental stock market, can also be useful in testing theories of investor behavior. To 
demonstrate this, we use neural data to test the “realization utility” theory of trading, a theory that 
has been used to address several facts about investor trading behavior, including the so-called 
disposition effect. 
The disposition effect is the robust empirical fact that individual investors have a greater 
propensity to sell stocks trading at a gain relative to purchase price, rather than stocks trading at a 
loss. This fact has attracted considerable attention because it has proven hard to explain using 
simple rational models of trading. This impasse has motivated the development of competing 
alternative theories, both rational and behavioral (Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), 
Barberis and Xiong (2009), Kaustia (2010)). One of these, the realization utility model (Shefrin 
and Statman (1985), Barberis and Xiong (2012), Ingersoll and Jin (2013)), is based on the 
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assumption that, in addition to deriving utility from consumption, investors also derive utility 
directly from realizing gains and losses on the sale of risky assets that they own. For example, if 
an investor realizes a gain (e.g., by buying a stock at $20 and selling it at $40), he receives a 
positive burst of utility proportional to the capital gain. In contrast, if he realizes a loss (e.g., by 
buying a stock at $20 and selling it at $10), he receives a negative burst of utility proportional to 
the realized loss. In combination with a sufficiently high time discount rate, realization utility will 
lead investors to exhibit a disposition effect (Barberis and Xiong (2012)). 
Testing a theory such as realization utility is difficult because its predictions about 
investor behavior are similar, on many dimensions, to those of other theories (but see Weber and 
Camerer (1998)). Furthermore, it is extremely difficult, using data on behavior alone, to carry out 
direct tests of the computations driving behavior (e.g., tests of whether, when thinking about 
selling, investors are tracking the capital gains they could potentially realize). However, as we 
show in this paper, a combination of neural measurement and careful experimental design does 
allow for direct tests of the extent to which the computations made by the brain at the time of 
decision-making are consistent with the mechanisms posited by different models. 
Specifically, in this paper, we describe the results of an fMRI study designed to test the 
hypothesis that, while trading in an experimental stock market, subjects are influenced by 
realization utility, and that this is associated with trading patterns consistent with the disposition 
effect. The experiment allows us to test several behavioral and neural predictions of the 
realization utility hypothesis.1 
Behaviorally, we find that the average subject in our experiment exhibits a strong and 
significant disposition effect. This stands in sharp contrast to the prediction of a simple rational 
trading model in which subjects maximize the expected value of final earnings. The reason is that 
our experimental design induces positive autocorrelation in stock price changes, which, in turn, 
implies that a risk-neutral rational trader would sell losing stocks more often than winning stocks, 
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thereby exhibiting the opposite of the disposition effect. The strong disposition effect displayed 
by our subjects is, however, consistent with the realization utility model. 
When taken literally as a description of the decision-making process, the realization 
utility model makes several predictions about the neural computations that should be observed at 
different points in time.	  	  We describe these predictions in detail in the main body of the paper, but 
summarize them briefly here.  
First, the realization utility model predicts that, at the moment when a subject is making a 
decision as to whether to sell a stock, neural activity in areas of the brain that are associated with 
encoding the value of potential actions at the time of a decision should be proportional to the 
capital gain that would be realized by the trade (i.e., to the difference between the sale price and 
the purchase price). In particular, the model implies that, at the time of decision, activity in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), an area of the brain that has been reliably shown to be 
involved in the computation of the value of the available options, should be positively correlated 
with the capital gain or loss associated with selling a stock. 
Second, the realization utility model predicts that a subject whose vmPFC activity at the 
time of a selling decision is particularly correlated with the potential capital gain or loss – in other 
words, a subject who is particularly influenced by realization utility – will exhibit a stronger 
disposition effect. Across individuals, then, the strength of the disposition effect should be 
correlated with the strength of the realization utility signal in the vmPFC. 
Third, the realization utility hypothesis posits that realizing a capital gain generates a 
positive burst of utility, while realizing a capital loss generates a negative one. This predicts that, 
controlling for the size of the capital gain or loss, and regardless of the precise timing of the 
utility burst, realizing a capital gain should increase activity in certain areas of the ventral 
striatum (vSt), while realizing a capital loss should decrease activity in these areas. This is 
because the vSt is known to encode so-called reward prediction errors, which measure the change 
in the expected net present value of lifetime utility induced by new information or changes in the 
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environment. Since selling a stock at a gain generates a utility burst, it also generates a change in 
the expected net present value of utility, one that should be reflected in the striatum at the 
moment of sale.  
Our fMRI measurements reveal patterns of neural activity that are largely consistent with 
the three neural predictions. This provides novel and strong support for the mechanisms at work 
in the realization utility model. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this also provides the first 
example of how neural evidence can be used to test economic models of financial decision-
making. We emphasize that the results do not imply that realization utility is the only force 
driving investor behavior, even in the context of our experiment. However, the fact that activity in 
the decision-making circuitry corresponds to some of the computations hypothesized by the 
realization utility model provides novel evidence in support of the model. It also suggests that 
computations of this kind may, in part, be driving the real-world transactions of individual 
investors. 
Using neural data to test an economic model is an unusual exercise in the field of 
economics. This is because a common view in the field is that models make “as if” predictions 
about behavior, and should not be taken as literal descriptions of how decisions are actually made 
(Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), Bernheim (2009)). In contrast to this view, we adopt a 
neuroeconomic approach. According to this approach, knowledge about the computational 
processes that the brain uses to make decisions should be of central interest to economists 
because, since these processes describe the actual determinants of observed behavior, they 
provide valuable insights into the drivers of economic activity (Camerer et al. (2005), Camerer 
(2007), Rustichini (2009), Glimcher (2010), Fehr and Rangel (2011)).  
Our study contributes to the nascent field of neurofinance, which seeks to characterize the 
computations undertaken by the brain to make financial decisions, and to understand how these 
computations map to behavior. Several early contributions are worth highlighting. Lo and Repin 
(2002) investigate the extent to which professional experience affects the emotional arousal of 
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traders in stressful situations, where arousal is measured using skin conductance responses and 
changes in blood pressure. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) use fMRI to measure neural responses 
during a simple investment task and find that activity in brain regions associated with emotional 
processing, such as the nucleus accumbens and the insula, predicts subjects’ willingness to take 
risks. Knutson et al. (2008) take these ideas further by showing that exogenous emotional cues 
(e.g., erotic pictures) can affect investment behavior, and that these cues increase activity in the 
same brain regions as in their previous study. More recently, Bruguier, Quartz, and Bossaerts 
(2010) show that fMRI measures of the extent to which subjects activate brain areas associated 
with concrete cognitive skills, such as the ability to predict another person’s state of mind, might 
be useful in identifying which subjects would be successful traders, while Wunderlich et al. 
(2011) look at how the brain tracks correlation during an attempt to optimally hedge two sources 
of risk. Finally, DeMartino et al. (2012) show that fMRI measures of activity in valuation and 
mentalizing (theory of mind) regions of the brain are associated with the propensity to buy during 
experimental price bubbles. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that a combination 
of fMRI neural measurements and careful experimental design can be used to test specific 
economic theories of financial decision making. More broadly, our work also contributes to the 
rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics, which seeks to characterize the computations made by 
the brain in different types of decisions, ranging from simple choices to choices involving risk, 
self-control, and complex social interactions.2  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents some background information on 
the disposition effect and realization utility. Section II describes the experimental design and the 
predictions of the realization utility hypothesis. Section III provides a detailed description of how 
fMRI can be used to test the neural predictions. Section IV presents the results. Section V 
concludes. 
 
I. Background: The Disposition Effect and the Realization Utility Model 
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 Using an argument based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, Shefrin 
and Statman (1985) predict that individual investors will have a greater propensity to sell stocks 
trading at a gain relative to purchase price, rather than stocks trading at a loss. They label this the 
“disposition effect” and provide some evidence for it using records of investor trading. More 
detailed evidence for the effect is presented by Odean (1998), who analyzes the trading activity, 
from 1987 to 1993, of 10,000 households with accounts at a large discount brokerage firm. The 
phenomenon has now been replicated in several other large databases of trading behavior.3 
It is useful to explain Odean’s (1998) methodology in more detail because we will adopt 
a similar methodology in our own analysis. For any day on which an investor in Odean’s (1998) 
sample sells shares of a stock, each stock in the investor’s portfolio on that day is assigned to one 
of four categories. A stock is counted as a “realized gain” (“realized loss”) if it is sold on that day 
at a price that is higher (lower) than the average price at which the investor purchased the shares. 
A stock is counted as a “paper gain” (“paper loss”) if its price is higher (lower) than its average 
purchase price, but it is not sold on that day. From the total number of realized gains and paper 
gains across all accounts over the entire sample, Odean (1998) computes the Proportion of Gains 
Realized (PGR): 
PGR = # of realized gains# of realized gains + # of paper gains . (1) 
In words, PGR computes the number of gains that were realized as a fraction of the number of 
gains that could have been realized. A similar ratio, PLR, is computed for losses: 
PLR = # of realized losses# of realized losses + # of paper losses . (2) 
The disposition effect is the empirical fact that PGR is significantly greater than PLR. Odean 
(1998) reports PGR = 0.148 and PLR = 0.098. 
 While the disposition effect is a robust empirical phenomenon, its causes remain unclear. 
In particular, traditional rational models of trading have had trouble capturing important features 
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of the data. Consider, for example, an information model in which investors sell stocks with paper 
gains because they have private information that these stocks will subsequently do poorly, and 
hold on to stocks with paper losses because they have private information that these stocks will 
rebound. This hypothesis is inconsistent with Odean’s finding that the average return of the prior 
winners that investors sell is 3.4% higher, over the next year, than the average return of the prior 
losers they hold on to. Another approach involves taking into account the favorable treatment of 
losses by the tax code. However, this also fails to explain the disposition effect because it predicts 
a greater propensity to sell stocks associated with paper losses. Another model attributes the 
disposition effect to portfolio rebalancing of the kind predicted by a framework with power utility 
preferences and i.i.d. returns. However, in this framework, rebalancing is the “smart” thing to do, 
which implies that we should observe a stronger disposition effect for more sophisticated 
investors. In contrast to this prediction, the data show that it is less sophisticated investors who 
exhibit a stronger disposition effect (Dhar and Zhu (2006)). 
Researchers have also proposed “behavioral economics” models of the disposition effect 
which can explain some of the empirical patterns that the rational frameworks have struggled to 
capture. One popular model assumes that investors have an irrational belief in mean-reversion 
(Odean (1998), Weber and Camerer (1998), Kaustia (2010)). If investors believe that stocks that 
have recently done well will subsequently do poorly, and that stocks that have recently done 
poorly will subsequently do well, their optimal trading strategy leads to a disposition effect. We 
label such beliefs “irrational” because they are at odds with Odean’s (1998) finding that the 
winner stocks investors sell subsequently do well, not poorly. While the mean-reversion 
hypothesis is appealing for its simplicity, and is consistent with some evidence from psychology 
on how people form beliefs, there are studies that cast doubt on its validity. For example, Weber 
and Camerer (1998) ask subjects to trade stocks in an experimental market, and find that these 
subjects exhibit a disposition effect in their trading. In order to test the mean-reversion 
hypothesis, they add a condition in which subjects’ holdings are exogenously liquidated at full 
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value at random times, after which subjects are asked to reinvest the proceeds across stocks in 
any way they like. If subjects were holding on to stocks with paper losses because of a belief in 
mean-reversion, we would expect them to re-establish their positions in these stocks. However, 
they do not do so. 
Another popular behavioral economics model posits that the disposition effect results 
from prospect theory preferences (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Prospect theory, a prominent 
theory of decision-making under risk, posits that individuals make decisions by computing the 
utility of potential gains and losses, where gains and losses are measured relative to a reference 
point that is often taken to be the status quo, and where the utility function is assumed to be 
concave over gains and convex over losses. At first sight, it appears that prospect theory may be 
helpful for understanding the disposition effect. If an investor is holding a stock that has risen in 
value, he may think of it as trading at a gain. If, moreover, the concavity of the value function 
over gains induces risk aversion, this may lead him to sell the stock. Conversely, if the convexity 
of the value function over losses induces risk-seeking, the investor may be inclined to hold on to a 
stock that has dropped in value. Barberis and Xiong (2009) have recently shown, however, that it 
is surprisingly difficult to formalize this intuition; they find that an investor who derives prospect 
theory utility from the annual trading profit on each stock that he owns will often exhibit the 
opposite of the disposition effect. Kaustia (2010) discusses other problems with the prospect 
theory approach; for example, he shows that it predicts that investors’ propensity to sell a stock 
will depend on the magnitude of the embedded paper gain in a way that is inconsistent with the 
empirical facts. 
 Another behavioral model of the disposition effect, and the one we focus on in this paper, 
is based on the realization utility hypothesis (Shefrin and Statman (1985), Barberis and Xiong 
(2012), Ingersoll and Jin (2013)). The central assumption of this model is that investors derive 
utility directly from realizing gains and losses on risky assets that they own: they experience a 
positive burst of utility when they sell an asset at a gain relative to purchase price, where the 
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amount of utility depends on the size of the realized gain; and a negative burst when they sell an 
asset at a loss relative to purchase price, where the amount of disutility depends on the size of the 
realized loss.4	  Barberis and Xiong (2012)	  show that, when realization utility has a linear 
functional form, and when the time discount rate is sufficiently positive, a trader who maximizes 
the expected discounted sum of future realization utility bursts will exhibit a disposition effect. 
The intuition is simple. If an investor derives pleasure from realizing capital gains and, moreover, 
is impatient, he will be keen to sell stocks at a gain. Conversely, if he finds it painful to sell stocks 
at a capital loss and also discounts future utility at a high rate, he will delay selling losing stocks 
for as long as possible.5   
While the realization utility hypothesis makes predictions about behavior that are 
consistent with the disposition effect, as well as with other empirical patterns, it is based on 
assumptions that depart significantly from those of traditional models. In particular, its 
predictions rely on the assumption that utility depends not only on consumption, but also on the 
act of realizing capital gains and losses. Given the unusual nature of this assumption, it seems 
especially important to carry out direct tests of the extent to which the hypothesized source of 
utility is actually computed by subjects and affects their decisions. In the rest of the paper, we 
show how this can be done using fMRI measures of neural activity. 
    
II. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
In this section, we first describe the experimental stock market that we set up to test the 
realization utility model, and then lay out the specific behavioral and neural predictions of the 
model that we test. 
 
A. Design 
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The design of our experimental market builds directly on that of an earlier non-neural 
experiment conducted by Weber and Camerer (1998). 
Subjects are given the opportunity to trade three stocks – stock A, stock B, and stock C – 
in an experimental market. The experiment consists of two identical sessions separated by a one-
minute break. Each session lasts approximately 16 minutes and consists of 108 trials. We use 𝑡 to 
index the trials within a session.6 
 At the beginning of each session, each subject is given $350 in experimental currency 
and is required to buy one share of each stock. The initial share price for each stock is $100; after 
the initial purchase, each subject is therefore left with $50. Every trial 𝑡 > 9 consists of two parts: 
a price update and a trading decision, each of which corresponds to a separate screen that the 
subject sees (Figure 1). In the price update part, one of the three stocks is chosen at random and 
the subject is shown a price change for this stock. Stock prices only evolve during the price 
update screens; as a result, subjects see the entire price path for each stock. In the trading part, 
one of the three stocks is again chosen at random and the subject is asked whether he wants to 
trade the stock. No new information is revealed during this part. 
We split each trial into two parts to temporally separate different types of computations 
associated with decision-making. At the price update screen, subjects are provided with 
information about a change in the price of one of the three stocks, but do not have to compute the 
value of buying or selling the stock, both because they are not allowed to make decisions at this 
stage, but also because they do not know which of the three assets will be selected for trading in 
the next screen. At the trading screen, the opposite situation holds: subjects need to compute the 
value of buying or selling a stock, but do not need to update their beliefs about the price process 
since no new information about prices is provided. 
Trials 1 through 9 consist only of a price update screen: subjects are not given the 
opportunity to buy or sell during these trials. This initial set of trials enables subjects to 
accumulate information about the three stocks before having to make any trading decisions. 
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 Each subject is allowed to hold a maximum of one share and a minimum of zero shares 
of each stock at any point in time. In particular, short-selling is not allowed. The trading decision 
therefore reduces to deciding whether to sell a stock (conditional on holding it), or deciding 
whether to buy it (conditional on not holding it). The price at which a subject can buy or sell a 
stock is given by its current market price. 
 The price path of each stock is governed by a two-state Markov chain with a good state 
and a bad state. The Markov chain for each stock is independent of the Markov chains for the 
other two stocks. Suppose that, in trial 𝑡, there is a price update for stock 𝑖. If stock 𝑖 is in the 
good state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.55 and decreases with probability 
0.45. Conversely, if it is in the bad state at that time, its price increases with probability 0.45 and 
decreases with probability 0.55. The magnitude of the price change is drawn uniformly from {$5, 
$10, $15}, independently of the direction of the price change. 
 The state of each stock changes over time in the following way. Before trial 1, we 
randomly assign a state to each stock. If the price update in trial 𝑡 > 1 is not about stock 𝑖, then 
the state of stock 𝑖 in trial 𝑡 remains the same as its state in the previous trial, trial 𝑡 − 1. If the 
price update in trial 𝑡 > 1 is about stock 𝑖, then the state of stock 𝑖 in this trial remains the same 
as in trial 𝑡 − 1 with probability 0.8, but switches with probability 0.2. In mathematical terms, if 𝑠!,! ∈ {𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑏𝑎𝑑} is the state of stock 𝑖 in trial 𝑡, then  if the time 𝑡 price update is not 
about stock 𝑖, whereas if the time 𝑡 price update is about stock 𝑖, the state switches as follows: 
 𝑠i,t = good 𝑠i,t  = bad 𝑠i,t-­‐1 = good 0.8 0.2 𝑠i,t-­‐1 = bad 0.2 0.8 
 
 
si,t = si,t−1
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The states of the stocks are never revealed to the subjects: they have to infer them from the 
observed price paths. To make it easier to compare the trading performance of different subjects, 
we use the same set of realized prices for all of them. 
A key aspect of our design is that, conditional on the information available to subjects, 
each of the stocks exhibits positive autocorrelation in its price changes. If a stock performed well 
at its last price update, it was probably in the good state for that price update. Since it is highly 
likely (probability 0.8) to remain in the same state for its next price update, its next price change 
is likely to also be positive. 
 At the end of each session, we liquidate subjects’ holdings of the three stocks and record 
the cash value of their position. We give subjects a financial incentive to maximize the final value 
of their portfolio at the end of each session. Specifically, if the total value of a subject’s cash and 
risky asset holdings at the end of session 1 is $X, in experimental currency, and the total value of 
his cash and risky asset holdings at the end of session 2 is $Y, again in experimental currency, 
then his take-home pay in actual dollars is 15 + (X+Y)/24.7 Subjects’ earnings ranged from 
$43.05 to $57.33 with a mean of $52.57 and a standard deviation of $3.35. 
 In order to avoid liquidity constraints, we allow subjects to carry a negative cash balance 
in order to purchase a stock if they do not have sufficient cash to do so at the time of a decision. If 
a subject ends the experiment with a negative cash balance, this amount is subtracted when 
computing the terminal value of his portfolio. The large initial cash endowment, together with the 
constraint that subjects can hold at most one unit of each stock at any moment, means that it is 
extremely unlikely, ex-ante, that a subject would end the experiment with a negative portfolio 
value; indeed, none of our subjects did.  
N=28 Caltech subjects participated in the experiment (22 male, age range 18 – 60, mean 
age: 25.6, std. of age: 7.6).8 All subjects were right-handed and had no history of psychiatric 
illness, and none were taking medications that interfere with fMRI. The exact instructions given 
to subjects at the beginning of the experiment are included in the Internet Appendix. The 
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instructions carefully describe the stochastic structure of the price process, as well as all other 
details of the experiment. Subjects were not explicitly told that stock price changes are positively 
autocorrelated. However, they were told about the Markov chain governing the stock price paths; 
they therefore had enough information to infer the positive autocorrelation. Before entering the 
scanner, the subjects underwent a practice session of 25 trials to ensure that they were familiar 
with the market software. 
There is a straightforward way to measure the extent to which a subject in our experiment 
exhibits a disposition effect in his trading. We simply adapt Odean’s (1998) methodology, 
described in Section I, in the following way. Every time a subject faces a decision about selling a 
stock, we classify his eventual action as a paper gain (loss) if the stock’s current price is above 
(below) the purchase price and he chooses not to sell; and as a realized gain (loss) if the stock’s 
current price is above (below) the purchase price and he chooses to sell. We then count up the 
number of paper gains, paper losses, realized gains, and realized losses over all selling decisions 
faced by the subject and compute the PGR and PLR measures described earlier. We assign the 
subject a disposition effect measure of PGR-PLR. When this measure is positive (negative), the 
subject exhibits (the opposite of) a disposition effect. 
 
B. Optimal Trading Strategy 
 We now characterize the optimal trading strategy for a risk-neutral Bayesian investor 
whose objective is to maximize the expected value of his take-home earnings; from now on, we 
refer to this investor as an “expected value” investor. The optimal strategy for this investor is to 
sell (or not buy) a stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the bad state than in the 
good state; and to buy (or hold) the stock when he believes that it is more likely to be in the good 
state. 
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Formally, let  be the price of stock 𝑖 in trial 𝑡 after any price update about the stock, 
and let  be the probability that a Bayesian investor, after 
seeing the price update in trial 𝑡, would assign to stock 𝑖 being in the good state in trial 𝑡. Also, let 𝑧! take the value 1 if the price update in trial 𝑡 indicates a price increase for the stock in question, 
and -1 if the price update indicates a price decrease. Then  if the price update in trial t 
is not about stock 𝑖; but if the price update in trial 𝑡 is about stock 𝑖, then: 
qi,t (qi,t−1, zt ) =
Pr(zt | si,t = good)Pr(si,t = good | qi,t−1)
Pr(zt | si,t = good)Pr(si,t = good | qi,t−1)+Pr(zt | si,t = bad)Pr(si,t = bad | qi,t−1)
=
(0.5+ 0.05zt )(0.8qi,t−1 + 0.2(1− qi,t−1))
(0.5+ 0.05zt )(0.8qi,t−1 + 0.2(1− qi,t−1))+ (0.5− 0.05zt )(0.2qi,t−1 + 0.8(1− qi,t−1))
.
	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
The optimal strategy for an expected value investor is to sell (if holding) or not buy (if not 
holding) stock 𝑖 in trial 𝑡 when 𝑞!,! < 0.5; and to hold or buy it otherwise. 
 Note that a trader who follows the optimal strategy described above will exhibit the 
opposite of the disposition effect. If a stock performed well on the last price update, it was 
probably in a good state for that price update. Since it is very likely to remain in the same state 
for its next price update, its next price change is likely to also be positive. The optimal strategy 
therefore involves selling winner stocks relatively rarely, and losing stocks more often, thereby 
generating the reverse of the disposition effect. 
 Of course, it is difficult for subjects to do the exact calculation in equation (3) in real time 
during the experiment. However, it is relatively straightforward for them to approximate the 
optimal strategy: they need simply keep track of each stock’s most recent price changes, and then 
hold on to stocks that have recently performed well while selling stocks that have recently 
performed poorly. The fact that a stock’s purchase price is reported on the trading screen makes it 
particularly easy to follow an approximate strategy of this kind: subjects can use the difference 
between the current price and the purchase price as a proxy for the stock’s recent performance.9 
pi,t
qi,t = Pr(si,t = good | pi,t, pi,t−1,..., pi,1)
qi,t = qi,t−1
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C. Behavioral and Neural Predictions of the Realization Utility Model 
 We now lay out the behavioral and neural predictions of the realization utility model, and 
contrast them with the predictions of the expected value model – the benchmark model which 
assumes a risk-neutral, Bayesian decision-maker. The specific realization utility model we have 
in mind is one where, as in Barberis and Xiong (2012), realization utility has a linear functional 
form, the time discount rate is strongly positive, and the agent maximizes the discounted sum of 
current and expected future realization utility flows. 
 Consider the behavioral predictions first. During the instruction session, subjects were 
told the structure of the data generating process for stock prices. From this, it is straightforward to 
infer that price changes are positively autocorrelated. In such a market, an expected value investor 
will exhibit the opposite of the disposition effect; indeed, for the actual sequence of prices that 
our subjects see, the value of the PGR-PLR measure under the optimal trading strategy for an 
expected value investor is -0.76. In other words, this investor will have a much greater propensity 
to realize losses than to realize gains. By contrast, a trader who experiences bursts of realization 
utility and who discounts future utility at a high rate will sell winner stocks more often than the 
expected value trader, and loser stocks less often. After all, he is keen to realize capital gains as 
soon as possible and to postpone realizing capital losses for as long as possible. This leads to our 
first prediction. 
 
Prediction 1 (Behavioral): For an expected value trader, the value of the PGR-PLR measure is -
0.76. By contrast, for a realization utility trader, the value of PGR-PLR is greater than -0.76. 
 
 We now turn to the neural predictions of the expected value and realization utility 
models. As noted earlier, a key goal of the paper is to test whether the basic assumptions of these 
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models are consistent with the computations that subjects actually make during the choice 
process. 
 The neural predictions build on basic findings from the field of decision neuroscience. A 
sizable number of studies have found evidence consistent with the idea that, in simple choice 
situations, the brain makes decisions by assigning values, often called “decision values,” to the 
options under consideration, and then comparing them to make a choice. These value signals are 
thought to reflect the relative value of getting the option under consideration versus staying with 
the status quo. In the context of a selling decision in our experiment, the decision value would 
reflect the value of selling a stock versus keeping it; in the context of a buying decision, it would 
reflect the value of getting the stock versus not buying it. A substantial body of work has shown 
that, in particular, activity in an area of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) reliably 
encodes decision value computations at the time of choice.10 
 Since this finding is critical to our analysis, it is important to summarize the key lines of 
evidence that support it. First, across a wide range of stimuli and choice paradigms, activity in the 
vmPFC, a region located at the front of the brain directly behind the bridge of the nose, correlates 
reliably with behavioral measures of the value of the objects of choice, and does so regardless of 
whether the object is actually chosen or not.11 Second, additional studies have shown that activity 
in the vmPFC is more likely to be associated with the computation of value than with alternative 
signals that are often correlated with value, but are distinct from it. For example, Plassmann, 
O’Doherty, and Rangel (2010) rule out that the vmPFC responses can be attributed to 
confounding anticipatory emotions or anticipatory emotion signals, and also show that these 
responses cannot be attributed to attentional, motor, or saliency signals.  Litt et al. (2011) carry 
out an additional test that also rules out the interpretation of vmPFC activity as attentional, motor, 
or saliency signals, but, in addition, show that activity in many other areas of the brain that has 
often been interpreted as a value signal (e.g., anterior insula activity) actually fits these alternative 
descriptions better. Third, patients with lesions in their vmPFC exhibit impairments in decision-
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making (e.g., an increase in the inconsistency of their choices, as measured by GARP violations), 
a result that has been widely interpreted as causal evidence for the role of vmPFC decision value 
signals in choice ((Fellows and Farah (2007), Camille et al. (2011), Camille, Tsuchida, and 
Fellows (2011)). Taken together, these findings provide strong support for the view, now widely 
held in neuroscience,12 that vmPFC responses at the time of choice encode valuation signals for 
the different stimuli for the purpose of guiding choice.13  
Our first two neural predictions involve comparing the decision value signals that we 
observe in the vmPFC to the decision value signals that would be predicted by the realization 
utility model and by the expected value model. To see the restrictions implied by these theories, 
consider first the decision value signal that would be computed at the time of making a selling 
decision by an individual who makes choices according to the expected value model. As noted 
earlier, in the context of our experiment, the decision value of selling a stock is the value of 
selling the stock minus the value of holding it. For the expected value investor, the value of 
selling the stock is zero: if he sells it, he will no longer own any shares of it, and so it can no 
longer generate any value for him. In contrast, the value of holding the stock can be approximated 
by the stock’s expected price change on its next price update: 
 (4) 
The decision value signal at the time of making a selling decision is therefore given by 0 − 0.6(2𝑞!,! − 1), or 0.6(1 − 2𝑞!,!); we will refer to this quantity throughout the paper as the 
net expected value of selling, or NEV. Note that this is only an approximation to the actual 
decision value because the exact value of holding a stock is the stock’s expected cumulative price 
change until the subject decides to sell it. However, there is little cost to using the above 
approximation because the value of holding a stock only for its next price change is highly 
correlated with the value of holding the stock until it is actually optimal to sell it (the latter 
quantity can be computed by simulation). 
Et[Δpi,t+1 | qi,t,  Δpi,t+1 ≠ 0]= 0.6(2qi,t −1).
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 Now consider the decision value signal that would be computed at the time of making a 
selling decision by an individual who makes choices according to the realization utility model. As 
noted earlier, we have in mind a simple form of the model in which the individual maximizes the 
discounted sum of expected future realized capital gains and losses. For such a trader, the value of 
selling is proportional to the capital gain or loss, given by 𝑝! − 𝑐!, where 𝑐! is the purchase price, 
or cost basis. Meanwhile, so long as the discount rate is sufficiently high, the value of holding the 
stock is approximately zero. Thus, for this trader, the decision value of selling is linearly related 
to 𝑝! − 𝑐!.14 This, together with the fact that decision value signals have been found to be 
encoded in the vmPFC, leads to the next prediction. 
 
Prediction 2 (Neural): For expected value traders, activity in the areas of the vmPFC associated 
with the computation of decision value should be linearly proportional to the NEV (given by 0.6(1 − 2𝑞!,!)) at the time of making selling decisions, and thus independent of the cost basis. In 
contrast, for realization utility traders, activity in these areas of the vmPFC should be linearly 
related to the realizable gain or loss, 𝑝!,! − 𝑐. 
 
The previous arguments indicate that, when making a selling decision, subjects who place 
a larger weight on realization utility should exhibit neural activity in the vmPFC that is more 
strongly correlated with the realizable capital gain or loss. However, subjects who place a larger 
weight on realization utility should also exhibit a stronger disposition effect. It follows that 
subjects whose vmPFC activity is more correlated with the realizable capital gain should exhibit a 
stronger disposition effect in their trading. 
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Prediction 3 (Neural): Under the realization utility model, the degree to which vmPFC activity 
correlates with the realizable capital gain should be correlated, across subjects, with the strength 
of the disposition effect in their trading. 
 
The final neural prediction is qualitatively different from the previous ones in that it seeks 
to test directly if subjects experience bursts of realization utility that are proportional to the 
capital gains they realize. One difficulty in testing this prediction is that, while the theory of 
realization utility says that the trader receives a utility burst at the moment of trade, it is hard to 
know, in practice, when exactly this burst occurs. For example, in our context, does it occur at the 
moment the subject presses a button to indicate his decision, or does it occur a little later when he 
reflects on the trade? Moreover, it is unclear what the duration of the burst is, in practice. In short, 
it is difficult to test the model by looking for neural markers of the hedonic response because we 
do not know when, exactly, to look for them. 
Fortunately, however, we can overcome this problem with the help of an idea from 
computational neuroscience. A sizable body of work has shown that an area located near the 
center of the brain called the ventral striatum (vSt) computes a quantity known as a prediction 
error in response to new information.15 The prediction error measures the change in the expected 
net present value of utility generated by the news, taking into account all sources of utility. It is 
positive if the news indicates an improvement in the expected net present value of utility, and 
negative otherwise. Importantly, it reflects the change in discounted utility, but is insensitive to 
the precise timing of the hedonic impact of the news. This is useful because it means that we can 
test for hedonic effects associated with realizing gains and losses by looking for a burst of activity 
in the vSt consistent with the change in discounted utility that these effects generate. In summary, 
under the realization utility model, when a trader sells a stock, this is associated with a utility 
burst; while we do not know the exact timing or duration of the burst, we do know that it 
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generates a change in the expected net present value of utility, one that should be reflected at the 
moment of sale in the prediction error computed by the vSt. 
 
Prediction 4 (Neural): Under the realization utility hypothesis, neural responses in the area of the 
vSt known to encode prediction errors should increase at the precise moment that traders realize a 
capital gain, and decrease at the moment they realize a capital loss.  
 
III. fMRI Data Collection and Analysis  
 
In this section, we describe how the fMRI measures of neural activity were collected and 
analyzed. The section contains enough information to serve as a brief primer on the subject for 
readers who are unfamiliar with fMRI. For a more detailed discussion, see Huettel, Song, and 
McCarthy (2004), Ashby (2011), and Poldrack, Mumford, and Nichols (2011). 
 
A. fMRI Data Collection and Measurement 
We collected measures of neural activity over the entire brain using BOLD-fMRI, which 
stands for blood-oxygenated level dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging. BOLD-
fMRI measures changes in local magnetic fields that result from the local inflows of oxygenated 
hemoglobin and outflows of de-oxygenated hemoglobin that occur when neurons fire. In 
particular, fMRI provides measures of the BOLD response in small “neighborhoods” of brain 
tissue called voxels, and is thought to measure the sum of the total amount of neuronal firing into 
that voxel and the total amount of neuronal firing within the voxel.16 
One important complication is that the hemoglobin responses measured by BOLD-fMRI 
are slower than the associated neuronal responses. Specifically, although the bulk of the neuronal 
response takes place quickly, BOLD measurements are affected for up to 24 seconds thereafter. 
Panel A of Figure 2 provides a more detailed illustration of the nature of the BOLD response. It 
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depicts the path of the BOLD signal in response to one (arbitrary) unit of neural activity of 
infinitesimal duration at time zero. The function plotted here is called the canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). It is denoted by ℎ(𝜏), where 𝜏 is the amount of time elapsed since the 
neural activity impulse, and has been shown to approximate well the pattern of BOLD responses 
for most subjects, brain areas, and tasks. 
Fortunately, there is a standard way of dealing with the complication described in the 
previous paragraph. In particular, the BOLD response has been shown to combine linearly across 
multiple sources of neural activity (Boynton et al. (1996)). This property, along with knowledge 
of the specific functional form of the HRF, allows us to construct a mapping from predicted 
neural activity to predicted BOLD responses. Specifically, if the predicted level of neural activity 
at any particular time is given by 𝑎(𝑡), then the level of BOLD activity at any instant 𝑡 is well 
approximated by  
b(t)= h(u)a(t −u)du,
0
∞
∫  (5) 
which is the convolution between the HRF and the neural inputs. This integral has a 
straightforward interpretation: it is a lagged sum of all the BOLD responses triggered by previous 
neural activity. Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the connection between neural activity and BOLD 
responses; it depicts a hypothetical path of neural activity (the solid line), together with the 
associated BOLD response (the dashed line). 
 During our experiment, we acquire two types of MRI data in a 3.0 Siemens Tesla Trio 
MRI scanner with an eight-channel phased array coil. First, we acquire BOLD-fMRI data while 
the subjects perform the experimental task. We use a voxel size of 3 mm3, and collect these data 
for the entire brain (~ 100,000 voxels) every 2.75 seconds.17 We also acquire high-resolution 
anatomical scans that we use mainly for realigning the brains across subjects and for localizing 
the brain activity identified by our analyses.18 
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B. fMRI Data Pre-processing 
 
Before the BOLD data can be analyzed to test our hypotheses, they have to be converted 
into a usable format. This requires the following steps, which are fairly standard – see Huettel, 
Song, and McCarthy (2004), Ashby (2011), and Poldrack, Mumford, and Nichols (2011)  – and 
which are implemented by way of a specialized but commonly-used software package called 
SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). 
First, we correct for slice acquisition time within each voxel. This is necessary because 
the scanner does not collect data on all brain voxels simultaneously. This simple step, which 
involves a nonlinear interpolation, temporally realigns the data across all voxels.  
Second, we correct for head motion to ensure that the time series of BOLD measurements 
recorded at a specific spatial location within the scanner is always associated with the same brain 
location throughout the experiment.19 
 Third, we realign the BOLD responses for each individual into a common 
neuroanatomical frame (the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template). This step, 
called spatial normalization, is necessary because brains come in different shapes and sizes; as a 
result, a given spatial location maps to different brain regions in different subjects. Spatial 
normalization involves a nonlinear reshaping of the brain to maximize the match with a target 
template. Although the transformed data are not perfectly aligned across subjects due to 
remaining neuroanatomical heterogeneity, the process is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of 
most studies. Furthermore, any imperfections in the realignment process introduce noise that 
reduces our ability to detect neural activity of interest. 
 Fourth, we also spatially smooth the BOLD data for each subject by making BOLD 
responses for each voxel a weighted sum of the responses in neighboring voxels, where the 
weights decrease with distance.20 This step ensures that the error structure of the data conforms to 
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the normality assumptions on the error structure of the regression models that we will use to test 
our hypotheses (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2004), Poldrack, Mumford, and Nichols (2011)). 
 Finally, we remove low-frequency signals that are unlikely to be associated with neuronal 
responses to individual trials.21 An example of such a signal is the effect of a continuous head 
movement over the course of the experiment that is not fully removed by the second correction 
step described above. 
	  
	  
C. fMRI Main Data Analyses 
The key goals of our analysis are to test if the region of the vmPFC that has been 
repeatedly shown to encode decision values at the time of choice exhibits activity consistent with 
Predictions 2 and 3; and if the area of the vSt known to encode prediction errors at the time of 
utility-relevant news exhibits activity consistent with Prediction 4. To do this, we run statistical 
tests to see if there are areas within these regions of the brain, given by collections of spatially 
contiguous voxels called clusters, where the BOLD response reflects neural activity that 
implements the computations of interest (e.g., realization utility computations). This is 
complicated by the fact that, since every voxel contains thousands of neurons, the BOLD 
responses in a voxel can be driven by multiple signals. Fortunately, the linear properties of the 
BOLD signal allow the neural signals of interest to be identified using standard linear regression 
methods. 
 The general statistical procedure is straightforward, and will be familiar to most 
economists (see Figure 3 for a summary). The analysis begins by specifying two types of 
variables that might affect the BOLD response: target computations and additional controls. The 
target computations reflect the signals we are looking for (e.g., a realization utility signal at the 
time of selling a stock). They are specified by a time series 𝑠!(𝑡) describing each signal of 
interest. For each of these signals, let 𝑆!(𝑡) denote the time series that results from convolving the 
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signal 𝑠!(𝑡) with the HRF, as described above. The additional controls, denoted by 𝑐!(𝑡), are 
other variables that might affect the BOLD time series (e.g., residual head movement or time 
trends). These are introduced to further clean up the noise in the BOLD signal, but are not 
explicitly used in any of our tests. The control variables are not convolved with the HRF because, 
while they affect the measured BOLD responses, they do not reflect neural activity which triggers 
a hemodynamic response.22 
 The linearity of the BOLD signal implies that the level of BOLD activity 𝑏!(𝑡) in any 
voxel 𝑣 at time 𝑡 should be given by 
bv (t) = constant + βivSi (t)+ α jvc j (t)+j∑i∑  ε(t) , (6) 
where 𝜀(𝑡) denotes AR(1) noise. This model is estimated independently in each of the voxels that 
fall within the relevant region of interest (the vmPFC for Predictions 2 and 3, and the vSt for 
Prediction 4). Our hypotheses can then be restated as tests about the coefficients of this regression 
model: signal 𝑖 is said to be associated with activity in voxel 𝑣 only if 𝛽!! is significantly different 
from zero. 
 Two additional considerations apply to most fMRI studies, including this one. First, we 
are interested in testing hypotheses about the distribution of the signal coefficients in the 
population of subjects, not hypotheses about individual subject coefficients. This would normally 
require estimating a mixed effects version of the linear model specified above, which, given the 
size of a typical fMRI dataset, would be computationally intensive. Fortunately, there is a 
shortcut that provides a good approximation to the full mixed effects analysis (Penny et al. 
(2006)). It involves estimating the parameters separately for each individual subject, averaging 
them across subjects, and then performing t-tests. This is the approach we follow here. 
 Second, since our tests are carried out in each of the voxels in the relevant regions of 
interest (429 voxels for the vmPFC, and 68 for the vSt), there is a concern about false-positives. 
To address this problem, we correct for multiple comparisons within the relevant region of 
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interest, a procedure known in the fMRI literature as a small volume correction (SVC). We report 
results as significant if they pass SVC correction at a level of p<0.05.23  
 As noted earlier, we conduct our tests in an area of the vmPFC that, in prior work, has 
been linked to the computation of decision values; and also in an area of the vSt that has been 
linked to the computation of prediction errors. Specifically, for the vmPFC region of interest, we 
construct a sphere with a 15 mm radius around the coordinates (MNI-space, 𝑥 = 3, 𝑦 = 36, 𝑧 = −18) that were found to exhibit peak correlation with decision values at the time of choice in 
Plassmann, O’Doherty, and Rangel (2010), and then intersect this sphere with an anatomical 
mask of the vmPFC.24 For the vSt region of interest, we construct a sphere with a 15 mm radius 
around the coordinates (MNI-space, 𝑥 = −15, 𝑦 = 6, 𝑧 = −12) that were found to exhibit peak 
correlation with prediction errors in Lin, Adolphs, and Rangel (2012), and then intersect this 
sphere with an anatomical mask of the vSt.25 As discussed in Section II, many studies have found 
results that are very similar to those of the two studies listed above; it is therefore not crucial 
which exact papers are used to define the regions of interest (so long as the radii of the spheres 
are sizable, as they are here). 
 
IV. Results 
 
A. Test of Behavioral Prediction 1 
 We begin our test of Prediction 1 by computing the strength of the disposition effect for 
each subject using the PGR-PLR measure described at the end of Section II.A. We find that the 
average PGR and PLR across subjects are 0.412 and 0.187, respectively. This implies an average 
PGR-PLR value of 0.225, which is significantly greater than 0 (p<0.001, in a two-tailed t-test 
against 0). In other words, not only is the average value of PGR-PLR significantly greater than 
the expected value model benchmark of -0.76, but it is actually significantly positive. These 
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results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that our subjects are all expected value investors, but 
are consistent with the hypothesis that some of them are influenced by realization utility. 
 Figure 4 depicts tests of Prediction 1 at the individual level. Each vertical bar shows the 
value of PGR-PLR for a particular subject. The horizontal dashed line near the bottom of the 
figure marks the -0.76 value of PGR-PLR that corresponds to an expected value investor. The 
figure shows that every subject exhibits a disposition effect greater than -0.76. The hypothesis 
that the average disposition effect is not different from -0.76 is rejected with a t-statistic of 
16.52.26 
The figure also shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the strength of the 
disposition effect across subjects: the value of PGR-PLR ranges from -0.41 to 0.83 and has a 
standard deviation of 0.32. This cross-individual variation is consistent with Dhar and Zhu (2006) 
who, using data on actual trading decisions, also find significant variation in the strength of the 
disposition effect across investors. Interestingly, while each of PGR and PLR varies a good deal 
across subjects, the two variables have a correlation of only 0.03: subjects who are slow to sell 
losing stocks are not necessarily also quick to sell winning stocks. This independence between 
selling behavior in the gain domain and the loss domain is also consistent with the empirical 
findings of Dhar and Zhu (2006).27 
 Figure 5 provides additional insight into our subjects’ selling behavior by showing, for 
each of the four types of decisions that a subject could make – decisions to realize a gain, 
decisions to realize a loss, decisions not to realize a gain, and decisions not to realize a loss -- the 
fraction of the decisions that are optimal, where “optimal” is defined by the expected value 
benchmark. For example, the figure shows that there were a total of 495 occasions in which our 
subjects realized gains, and that most of these decisions were suboptimal. Given that stocks 
exhibit short-term price momentum in the experiment, it is generally better to hold on to a stock 
that has been performing well. This explains why most (77.9%) of subjects’ decisions to hold on 
to winning stocks were optimal, and why most (67.5%) of subjects’ decisions to sell winning 
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stocks were suboptimal. Similarly, in the experiment, it is generally better to sell a stock that has 
been performing poorly. This explains why most (79.2%) of subjects’ decisions to sell losing 
stocks were optimal, while most (80.3%) of their decisions to hold these stocks were suboptimal. 
The disposition effect exhibited by our subjects is stronger than that found in empirical 
studies (Odean (1998), Frazzini (2006)). One possible reason for this is that the current price and 
the cost basis of a stock are both prominently displayed on the trading screen.28 If, because of 
realization utility, a subject has a preference for realizing gains and for not realizing losses, the 
fact that we report the purchase price may make it easier for him to cater to this preference, and 
hence to exhibit a disposition effect.29 
In summary, the behavioral results indicate that our average subject exhibits a strong 
disposition effect. This is inconsistent with the expected value model, but is consistent with the 
realization utility model. 
 
B. Test of Neural Prediction 2 
We now turn to Prediction 2. This states that, for subjects who experience realization 
utility, activity in an area of the vmPFC known to encode decision values at the time of making a 
decision should be correlated with the capital gain variable 𝑝! − 𝑐!. By contrast, it states that, for 
expected value subjects, activity in this area should correlate with the NEV variable, but not with 
the capital gain. 
The pre-specified region of the vmPFC in which we test for the decision value signals – a 
region we defined at the end of Section III -- is the area colored yellow and orange in Figure 6; as 
noted in Section III, it contains 429 voxels. To carry out the main test of Prediction 2, we estimate 
the following general linear model (GLM) of BOLD activity in every subject and voxel: 
bv (t) = constant +β1vIdec (t)(pt − ct )+β2vIdec (t)NEVt +β3vcontrols + ε(t).  (7) 
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As noted earlier, 𝑏!(𝑡) denotes the BOLD signal at time 𝑡 in voxel 𝑣. 𝐼!"#  is an indicator function 
that equals one if, at time 𝑡, the subject is presented with an opportunity to sell a stock; 𝑝! − 𝑐! is 
the realizable capital gain; and NEV! is the net expected value from selling the stock under 
consideration at time t, namely 0.6 1 − 2𝑞!,! . Finally, the “controls” vector includes the 
following variables: 1) an indicator function denoting the onset of a selling opportunity, 2) an 
indicator function denoting the onset of a buying opportunity, 3) an indicator function denoting 
the onset of a buying opportunity interacted with the NEV of buying the asset, 4) an indicator 
function denoting the onset of a price update screen when the subject owns the asset, 5) an 
indicator function denoting the onset of a price update screen when the subject owns the asset 
interacted with the price change, 6) an indicator function denoting the onset of a price update 
screen when the subject does not own the asset, 7) an indicator function denoting the onset of a 
price update screen when the subject does not own the asset interacted with the price change, 8) 
regressors controlling for physical movement inside the scanner, and 9) session indicator 
variables. Controls (1) - (7) are convolved with the HRF, whereas controls (8) and (9) are not. As 
described in Section III.A, these controls are necessary because the BOLD signal is affected for 
up to 24 seconds after the initial neural impulse generated by the onset of a decision screen or 
price update screen (Figure 2).30 Therefore, some portion of the variance in the BOLD signal we 
observe at the time subjects are computing their sell/hold decision can be attributed to the specific 
events we are controlling for. We will use this same vector of control variables in each GLM we 
estimate in this paper. Finally, inferences about the extent to which the signals of interest are 
encoded in a given voxel are made by carrying out a one-sided t-test against zero of the average 
of the individually estimated coefficients (i.e., of the average 𝛽!!  across subjects, and of the 
average 𝛽!! across subjects), and by correcting for multiple comparisons within the pre-specified 
vmPFC region of interest. 
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 As shown in Figure 6, the results from these tests are consistent with the predictions of 
the realization utility model, but not with those of the expected value model. Within the pre-
specified 429-voxel vmPFC target region associated with the computation of decision values in 
previous studies, we find a cluster of 27 voxels where 𝛽!!, averaged across subjects, is 
significantly positive. Below, we refer to these 27 voxels as the vmPFCROI. In contrast to the 
significant results we find for the capital gain regressor, there are no clusters that significantly 
relate to the NEV variable at our statistical threshold. 
 The previous analysis identifies a region of the vmPFC, the vmPFCROI, in which 
responses at the time of choice are consistent with the computation of the decision value 
predicted by the realization utility model. We now carry out two additional tests of the properties 
of the signals in this area. The first test investigates if the capital gain variable 𝑝! − 𝑐! is reflected 
in the vmPFCROI to differing extents in trials involving capital gains and trials involving capital 
losses. To do this, we estimate the following subject- and voxel-level GLM: 
bv (t) = constant +β v1Idec (t)Icap.gain (t)(pt − ct )+β v2Idec (t)Icap.loss (t)(pt − ct )+β v3controls+ε(t) , (8) 
where Icap.gain and Icap.loss are indicator functions for trials involving capital gains and capital losses, 
respectively. For each individual, we compute the mean 𝛽!! and the mean  𝛽!! across the voxels in 
the vmPFCROI; we then average these means across subjects. The resulting values of β! =0.028  and  β! = 0.029 are not significantly different from each other (p=0.94). Thus, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the net capital gain signal has a linear functional form. 
 The second test checks whether, as predicted by the realization utility model, the signal in 
the vmPFC related to decision values is both positively correlated with 𝑝! and negatively 
correlated with 𝑐!. This test is important because it goes to the core of the “irrationality” implicit 
in the realization utility model, namely that people are influenced by the cost basis when deciding 
whether to sell an asset. The test is based on the following GLM: 
bv (t) = constant +β v1Idec (t)pt +β v2Idec (t)ct +β v3controls+ε(t) . (9) 
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The key hypothesis of interest is that 𝛽! < 0. We cannot conduct this test in the vmPFCROI: since 
this region consists of voxels that correlate with 𝑝! − 𝑐!, the test would be biased in favor of the 
hypothesis. To avoid this bias, we first estimate equation (9) for each of the 429 voxels in the 
independent vmPFC target region (taken, as described in Section III.C, from Plassmann, 
O’Doherty, and Rangel (2010) and an anatomical mask of the vmPFC) and then identify voxels 
that exhibit significant correlation with 𝑝! (p<0.05, SVC); we give this set of voxels the label 
vmPFCp. We then test whether voxels in this region correlate significantly with the cost basis. 
The effect size, averaged across voxels in vmPFCp for each subject, and then across subjects, is 
given by 𝛽! = −0.019, (p=0.03). This provides further evidence in support of the realization 
utility hypothesis. 
 
C. Test of Neural Prediction 3 
 We now test Prediction 3. Specifically, we check whether, as predicted by the realization 
utility model, subjects whose neural activity in the vmPFC at the time of a sell decision is 
particularly sensitive to the realizable capital gain also exhibit a stronger disposition effect. 
 To make the logic of the test clearer, we conduct it separately for decisions involving 
capital gains and decisions involving capital losses. In particular, for each subject, we compute a 
neural measure of the degree to which a positive capital gain is represented in the vmPFC at the 
time of choice; and also a neural measure of the degree to which a negative capital gain – in other 
words, a capital loss – is represented in the vmPFC at the time of choice. These subject-level 
statistics are given by the maximum value, across voxels in the vmPFCROI, of 𝛽!! and 𝛽!! from 
equation (8).31 
According to Prediction 3, subjects with a high maximum value of 𝛽!! -- in other words, 
subjects whose computations, at the time of a selling decision about a stock with a capital gain, 
are particularly consistent with the realization utility model – should exhibit a higher value of 
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PGR, in other words, a higher propensity to realize gains. Consistent with this, we find that the 
correlation, across subjects, between the maximum 𝛽!! and PGR is 0.58 (p=0.001). The top panel 
in Figure 7 illustrates this graphically. 
Prediction 3 also implies that there should be a negative correlation, across subjects, 
between the maximum 𝛽!! and PLR: subjects with a high maximum value of 𝛽!! – again, subjects 
whose computations at the time of making a selling decision about a stock with a capital loss are 
particularly consistent with the realization utility model – should exhibit a lower propensity to 
realize losses. However, we do not find a significant correlation between the maximum 𝛽!! and 
PLR (p=0.475). This can be seen in the lower panel of Figure 7. 
In summary, then, the results in this section are consistent with Prediction 3 for selling 
decisions involving capital gains, but not for selling decisions involving capital losses. In Section 
V, we discuss why this might be the case. 
 
D. Test of Neural Prediction 4 
 Prediction 4 tests a basic assumption of the realization utility model. The model posits 
that selling a stock at a gain generates a positive hedonic effect, and that selling a stock at a loss 
generates a negative hedonic effect, independent of the impact of the trade on lifetime 
consumption. As discussed in Section II, while in theory this hedonic impact occurs at the 
moment of sale, in practice it is hard to know what its precise timing and duration are. However, 
we do know that the utility burst corresponds to a change in discounted lifetime utility; as such, it 
should generate a prediction error at the moment of sale. This leads to the following form of 
Prediction 4: controlling for the size of a capital gain, a decision to realize the gain should lead to 
a positive response in the areas of the vSt known to correlate positively with prediction errors. 
The region colored yellow and orange in Figure 8 shows the pre-specified region of the 
vSt that has been identified in previous studies as being involved in the computation of 
predictions errors. It is in this region – one that, as noted in Section III.C, contains 68 voxels -- 
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that we look for a positive effect of realizing capital gains.32 Specifically, our test of Prediction 4 
is based on the following GLM: 
bv (t) = constant +β v1Idec (t)Icap.gain (t)(pt − ct )
 +β v2Idec (t)Icap.gain (t)Isell (t)+β v3Idec (t)Icap.loss (t)+β v4controls+ε(t).
 
(10) 
As before, 𝐼!"# is an indicator function denoting an opportunity to sell a stock,   𝐼!"#.!"#$  is an 
indicator function denoting that the subject has an opportunity to sell a capital gain, and  𝐼!"#.!"##  is 
an indicator function denoting that the subject has an opportunity to sell a capital loss. Finally,   𝐼!"##  is an indicator function denoting that the subject actually sold the stock. Note that this model 
allows us to estimate the marginal effect that realizing a capital gain (the second non-constant 
regressor) has on neural activity in the vSt, after controlling for the size of the capital gain (the 
first non-constant regressor).33 The key test of interest is whether there are voxels within the 
target vSt region for which 𝛽!!, averaged across subjects, is significantly positive. 
Consistent with Prediction 4, we find a region of the vSt in which activity correlates 
positively with the realization of capital gains (see Panel A of Figure 8, p<0.05, SVC), while 
controlling for the magnitude of the capital gain. Panel B of Figure 8 shows the time-course of the 
average BOLD response in the original 68-voxel target vSt region when subjects issue a 
command to sell a capital gain (the blue line) compared to when they issue a command to hold a 
capital gain (the red line).34  
Ideally, we would also carry out a test for the case of capital losses; specifically, we 
would test for a negative impact in the same area of the vSt when a capital loss is realized. 
Unfortunately, there is a feature of the data that does not allow us to do this. As predicted by the 
realization utility hypothesis, subjects realized very few losses over the course of the two fMRI 
sessions they each went through (the mean number of realized losses per subject session is three). 
As a result, we do not have the statistical power we need to look at the difference in neural 
responses when a loss is realized vs. not realized. 
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E. Tests of the Mean-reversion Theory of the Disposition Effect 
As discussed in Section I, one prominent alternative theory of the disposition effect is 
that investors believe that stock prices mean-revert (Odean (1998), Weber and Camerer (1998), 
Kaustia (2010)). In our setting, such a belief would be irrational: stock prices in our experiment 
exhibit positive autocorrelation. Nonetheless, if, for some reason, our subjects think that stock 
prices in our experiment are mean-reverting, this could potentially explain why they tend to sell 
stocks that have recently gone up and hold on to stocks that have recently gone down. In this 
section, we test this alternative theory using both behavioral and neural data. 
 To investigate whether a belief in mean-reversion is driving our subjects’ behavior, we 
estimate the following mixed effects logistic model. The model tests whether, as predicted by the 
mean-reversion hypothesis, recent price changes can significantly predict subjects’ decisions to 
sell or hold a stock: 
sellt = constant +β1NEVt +β2 (pt − ct )+β3Δ1pt +β4Δ2pt +εt.  (11) 
Here, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙! = 1 if the subject sells the stock under consideration at time 𝑡 and 0 if he holds it, and Δ!𝑝! denotes the mth most recent price change for this stock (these price changes may not have 
occurred in consecutive trials because price updates in the experiment take place at random 
times). We find that the capital gain has a coefficient of 0.017 and is a significant predictor of the 
propensity to sell (t-stat=2.93), but that none of the other variables are. In particular, neither 𝛽!  nor 𝛽! is significantly different from zero (p=0.569 and p=0.197, respectively). In other words, 
contrary to the mean-reversion hypothesis, recent price changes do not significantly predict the 
decision to sell.35 
 We can also use the neural data to test the mean-reversion hypothesis. In particular, we 
test if neural activity in the target region of the vmPFC, defined at the end of Section III.C, is 
correlated with recent price changes. We do this by estimating the following GLM: 
	   35	  
bv (t) = constant + Idec (t)[β v1(pt − ct )+β v2Δ1pt +β v3Δ2pt ]+β v4controls+ε(t).  (12) 
Under the mean-reversion hypothesis, the decision value of selling should be positively correlated 
with recent price changes: a recent price increase indicates a lower expected future return and 
hence a higher decision value of selling. Under this hypothesis, then, responses in the vmPFC 
(i.e., the area involved in the computation of decision values) should correlate positively with past 
price changes. Contrary to this hypothesis, we do not find any activity in the vmPFC that is 
significantly associated with the past price-change regressors at our omnibus threshold of p<0.05 
SVC. In summary, then, both the behavioral and neural analyses cast doubt on the mean-
reversion hypothesis.36 
 
V. Discussion 
In this paper we use neural data, obtained through fMRI while our subjects trade stocks in an 
experimental market, to test the key assumptions of the “realization utility” theory of investor 
trading. We find broad (albeit not perfect) support for the neural predictions of this theory. First, 
we find that activity in the vmPFC, an area known to encode decision values, is correlated with 
the capital gain (the decision value under realization utility), but not with a measure of the net 
expected value of future returns (the decision value under the expected value model). Second, we 
find that the strength with which the capital gain is reflected in the vmPFC decision value signal 
is correlated, across subjects, with the proportion of gains realized; we do not, however, find the 
analogous correlation for capital losses. Finally, and perhaps most striking of all, we find that 
activity in the ventral striatum, an area known to encode information about changes in expected 
lifetime utility, exhibits a positive response when subjects realize capital gains, controlling for the 
size of those gains. This is a striking finding because it provides a direct test of the key 
mechanism at work in the realization utility model; it would have been very hard to carry out 
such a test without neural data. 
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As noted in the previous paragraph, we do not find a correlation across individuals 
between the strength with which a capital loss is reflected in the vmPFC and the proportion of 
losses realized. Here we speculate as to why. One possibility is that the simple model of linear 
realization utility that we test is incomplete in important ways.  First, recall that individuals who 
experience realization utility at the time of selling, and who are sufficiently myopic, will 
accelerate the sale of assets involving capital gains and delay the sale of assets involving capital 
losses, even though this is suboptimal under the expected value model. When we compute the 
decision value of selling for realization utility traders, we assume that they are fully myopic. 
However, if the cross-individual variation in the discount rate for losses is sufficiently larger than 
that for gains (a hypothesis that has not yet been tested), then the decision value of selling a loss 
will be measured in our regression models with more noise than the decision value of selling a 
gain.37 If this is the case, we are more likely to detect a behavioral-neural correlation for capital 
gains than for capital losses, even if subjects experience realization utility in both cases. Second, 
the cross-subject correlation between the extent to which capital gains and capital losses are 
reflected in the vmPFC is only 0.01, while the cross-subject correlation between the propensity to 
realize gains and the propensity to realize losses is only 0.03. This suggests that individuals may 
attend differently to gains and losses in a way that is not captured by our realization utility model  
(Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009), Kuhnen and Knutson (2011)).  
These modifications of the benchmark realization utility model are inspired by the data, 
but are clearly also post-hoc and speculative. The good news, however, is that the same 
methodology that we use here can also be applied to test these alternative specifications. 
 We emphasize that the methods we present in this paper are not a substitute for 
traditional empirical methods in finance. On the contrary, brain imaging techniques are 
complementary tools that can be used to test assumptions about investor behavior that are 
difficult to evaluate using field data or experimental data alone. In particular, we see neural data 
as a valuable resource when studying the more psychological dimensions of investor behavior, 
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precisely because these may derive from variables that are only observable at the neural level.  
For example, using the same dataset as in this study, we are examining how neural measures of 
regret, which are very difficult to measure objectively in the field, can impact trading behavior in 
a systematic way (Frydman et al. (2012)). The identification of investors’ reference points – the 
reference rates of return that they use to determine whether an investment outcome is a “gain” or 
a “loss” – is another challenging question that neural data may help us answer.  
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Figure	  1.	  Sample	  screens	  from	  a	  typical	  trial	  in	  the	  fMRI	  experiment.	  For	  trials	  10-­‐108,	  subjects	  see	  a	  price	  update	  screen	  for	  two	  seconds,	  followed	  by	  a	  trading	  screen	  for	  which	  they	  have	  up	  to	  three	  seconds	  to	  enter	  a	  decision	  (a	  blank	  screen	  is	  displayed	  in	  between	  to	  temporally	  separate	  different	  types	  of	  neural	  activity	  associated	  with	  decision-­‐making).	  Because	  the	  blank	  screen	  is	  displayed	  for	  a	  random	  amount	  of	  time,	  uniformly	  distributed	  between	  one	  and	  three	  seconds,	  the	  average	  length	  of	  a	  trial,	  consisting	  of	  all	  three	  screens,	  is	  seven	  seconds.	  The	  screens	  shown	  below	  are	  for	  a	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  owns	  both	  stocks	  A	  and	  B.	  If	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  own	  stock	  B	  at	  the	  price	  update	  screen,	  the	  purchase	  price	  would	  not	  be	  displayed.	  If	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  own	  stock	  A	  at	  the	  trading	  screen,	  he	  would	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  it.	  The	  screens	  are	  displayed	  while	  subjects	  are	  inside	  an	  fMRI	  scanner,	  and	  decisions	  are	  entered	  using	  a	  handheld	  device.	  For	  trials	  1-­‐9,	  subjects	  see	  only	  the	  price	  update	  screen	  and	  the	  blank	  screen;	  this	  allows	  them	  to	  accumulate	  information	  about	  price	  changes	  before	  having	  to	  make	  any	  decisions.	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Figure	  2.	  BOLD	  measurements	  of	  neural	  activity.	  (A)	  Because	  fMRI	  measures	  the	  blood	  oxygen	  level	  dependent	  (BOLD)	  response,	  and	  not	  neural	  activity	  itself,	  we	  need	  a	  mapping	  from	  neural	  activity	  to	  the	  BOLD	  response	  in	  order	  to	  make	  inferences	  about	  changes	  in	  neural	  activity.	  This	  mapping	  is	  known	  as	  the	  canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	  function,	  and	  is	  shown	  here	  as	  a	  function	  of	  one	  arbitrary	  unit	  of	  instantaneous	  neural	  activity	  at	  time	  0.	  (B)	  This	  figure	  shows	  the	  BOLD	  response	  (the	  dashed	  line)	  that	  results	  from	  three	  sequential	  sources	  of	  neural	  activity	  (the	  solid	  line).	  The	  BOLD	  response	  combines	  linearly	  across	  multiple	  sources	  of	  neural	  activity.	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Figure	  3.	  Process	  of	  constructing	  a	  general	  linear	  model	  (GLM).	  There	  are	  two	  sets	  of	  regressors:	  target	  computations	  and	  additional	  controls.	  	  Target	  computations	  reflect	  the	  signals	  of	  interest	  whereas	  additional	  controls	  are	  used	  to	  clean	  up	  noise	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  BOLD	  signal.	  Because	  the	  target	  computations	  are	  induced	  by	  neural	  activity,	  we	  convolve	  them;	  we	  do	  not	  convolve	  additional	  controls	  because	  they	  do	  not	  trigger	  a	  hemodynamic	  response.	  Finally,	  we	  enter	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  variables,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  convolved,	  into	  a	  GLM	  with	  AR(1)	  noise.	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Figure	  4.	  Measures	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  (PGR-­‐PLR)	  for	  each	  subject.	  Each	  vertical	  column	  corresponds	  to	  a	  specific	  subject	  in	  our	  experiment.	  We	  compute	  standard	  error	  bars	  as	  in	  Odean	  (1998).	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  the	  level	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  that	  an	  expected	  value	  trader	  would	  exhibit,	  namely	  -­‐0.76.	  All	  subjects	  exhibit	  a	  disposition	  effect	  greater	  than	  this	  benchmark	  level,	  and	  a	  majority	  have	  a	  disposition	  effect	  that	  is	  significantly	  positive.	  The	  figure	  also	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect	  across	  subjects	  (std:	  0.32).	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Figure	  5.	  Total	  number	  of	  sell	  decisions	  by	  decision	  type	  and	  optimality.	  	  A	  realized	  gain	  (loss)	  refers	  to	  a	  decision	  where	  a	  subject	  sells	  a	  stock	  trading	  at	  a	  gain	  (loss)	  relative	  to	  purchase	  price.	  A	  paper	  gain	  (loss)	  refers	  to	  a	  decision	  where	  a	  subject	  decides	  to	  hold	  a	  stock	  trading	  at	  a	  gain	  (loss).	  The	  optimality	  measures	  show	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  our	  design:	  selling	  winners	  and	  holding	  losers,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  disposition	  effect,	  are	  typically	  suboptimal	  decisions.	  Decisions	  are	  pooled	  across	  all	  subjects.	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Figure	  6.	  vmPFC	  activity	  reflects	  realization	  utility.	  The	  figure	  presents	  estimation	  results	  from	  equation	  (7),	  	  	  
bv (t) = constant +β1vIdec (t)(pt − ct )+β2vIdec (t)NEVt +β3vcontrols + ε(t).  Yellow	  voxels	  are	  those	  that	  are	  in	  our	  pre-­‐specified	  region	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  vmPFC.	  Red	  voxels	  are	  those	  that	  exhibit	  activity	  at	  the	  time	  of	  trading	  screen	  onset	  that	  significantly	  correlates	  with	  the	  realizable	  capital	  gain.	  Orange	  voxels	  are	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  two	  groups.	  For	  illustration	  purposes,	  the	  significance	  threshold	  for	  the	  image	  is	  p<0.001	  with	  a	  15	  voxel	  extent	  threshold,	  but	  all	  statistics	  reported	  in	  the	  paper	  are	  also	  small	  volume	  corrected	  at	  p<0.05	  using	  FWE.	  The	  𝑧 = −21	  coordinate	  and	  the	  𝑦 = 39	  coordinate	  indicate	  which	  two-­‐dimensional	  plane	  is	  shown	  in	  each	  of	  the	  two	  brain	  maps.	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Figure	  7.	  Correlation	  between	  brain	  activity	  and	  measures	  of	  the	  disposition	  effect.	  Each	  data	  point	  in	  the	  figure	  represents	  a	  single	  subject.	  (A)	  We	  find	  that,	  across	  subjects,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  vmPFC	  activity,	  during	  a	  selling	  decision	  for	  a	  stock	  with	  a	  gain,	  is	  correlated	  with	  the	  gain,	  is	  itself	  correlated	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  gains	  realized.	  (B)	  We	  do	  not	  find	  a	  similar	  correlation	  between	  the	  proportion	  of	  losses	  realized	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  vmPFC	  activity,	  during	  a	  selling	  decision	  for	  a	  stock	  with	  a	  loss,	  is	  correlated	  with	  the	  loss.	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Figure	  8.	  Direct	  tests	  of	  the	  realization	  utility	  hypothesis.	  	  (A)	  Yellow	  voxels	  are	  those	  that	  are	  in	  our	  a	  priori	  region	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  vSt.	  Red	  voxels	  are	  those	  that	  exhibit	  greater	  activity	  when	  subjects	  realize	  capital	  gains	  compared	  to	  when	  they	  hold	  capital	  gains	  (shown	  at	  p<0.001	  uncorrected	  with	  a	  15	  voxel	  extent	  threshold,	  for	  illustrative	  purposes	  only).	  Orange	  voxels	  are	  those	  that	  are	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  two	  groups.	  The	  𝑦 = 6	  coordinate	  indicates	  which	  two-­‐dimensional	  plane	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  brain	  map.	  (B)	  The	  figure	  shows	  the	  time-­‐course	  of	  activity	  in	  the	  vSt,	  averaged	  over	  the	  a	  priori	  region	  of	  interest,	  during	  trials	  when	  subjects	  are	  offered	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  a	  stock	  trading	  at	  a	  gain.	  The	  blue	  line	  plots	  the	  average	  activity	  in	  trials	  where	  subjects	  decide	  to	  realize	  the	  gain,	  while	  the	  red	  line	  plots	  the	  average	  activity	  in	  trials	  where	  subjects	  instead	  decide	  not	  to	  realize	  the	  gain.	  	  **	  denotes	  p<0.01,	  *	  denotes	  p<0.05	  (paired	  t-­‐test).	  	  t=0	  corresponds	  to	  the	  instant	  at	  which	  the	  subject	  enters	  his	  trading	  decision	  on	  a	  hand-­‐held	  device.	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Footnotes	  	  
1 We use the word “behavioral” in two different senses. Most of the time, as in the last sentence of this 
paragraph, we take it to mean “pertaining to behavior.” Occasionally, we take it to mean “less than fully 
rational” or “psychological,” as is common in the social sciences. It will be clear from the context which of 
the two meanings is intended. 
2	  For recent reviews, see Fehr and Camerer (2007), Glimcher et al. (2008), Rangel, Camerer, and Montague 
(2008), Bossaerts (2009), Kable and Glimcher (2009), Rangel and Hare (2010), Fehr and Rangel (2011), 
and Rushworth et al. (2011).	  
3	  See, for example, Genesove and Mayer (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Feng and Seasholes 
(2005), Frazzini (2006), and Jin and Scherbina (2011).	  4	  Barberis and Xiong (2012) speculate that realization utility arises because of the way people think about 
their investing history. Under this view, some investors – in particular, less sophisticated investors -- do not 
think about their investing history in terms of overall portfolio return, but rather as a series of investing 
“episodes,” each of which is characterized by three things: the identity of the asset, the purchase price, and 
the sale price. “I bought GE at $40 and sold it at $70” might be one such episode, for example. According 
to this view, an investor who sells a stock at a gain feels a burst of positive utility right then because, 
through the act of selling, he is creating what he views as a positive investing episode. Similarly, if he sells 
a stock at a loss, he experiences a burst of disutility: by selling, he is creating a negative investing episode. 5	  Time discounting is not a critical part of the realization utility hypothesis. The disposition effect can also 
be generated by a model with no time discounting but where realization utility has an S-shaped functional 
form, as in prospect theory (Barberis and Xiong (2009)). Adopting this alternative version of the realization 
utility hypothesis would not significantly affect our analysis.	  6	  We split our experiment into two sessions in order to avoid running the fMRI machine for too long 
without a break, as this could lead to potential medical risks for the subjects.	  	  
7 In other words, we average X and Y to get (X+Y)/2, convert the experimental currency to actual dollars 
using a 12:1 exchange rate, and add a $15 show-up fee. 
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8 One additional subject participated in the experiment but was excluded from further analyses because his 
head motion during the scanning exceeded a pre-specified threshold, thereby affecting the reliability of the 
neural measurements.	  
9 Our rational benchmark assumes risk neutrality because the monetary risk in our experiment is small. We 
have also considered the case of risk aversion, however, and concluded that its predictions do not differ 
significantly from those of risk neutrality. In some models, risk aversion can generate a disposition effect 
through rebalancing motives. This is not the case in our experiment, however, because the volatility of 
stock price changes is independent of the level of the price. Furthermore, any rebalancing motives would be 
of second-order importance relative to the impact of time variation in the mean stock return. 10	  See, for example, Hsu et al. (2005), Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006), Kable and Glimcher (2007), 
Knutson et al. (2007), Tom et al. (2007), Hare et al. (2008), Kennerley et al. (2008), Chib et al. (2009), 
Hare et al. (2009), Hsu et al. (2009), Hare et al. (2010), Levy et al. (2010), Rangel and Hare (2010), and 
Litt et al. (2011).	  11	  The evidence on this point is extensive. See Kable and Glimcher (2007), Plassmann et al. (2007), Tom et 
al. (2007), Hare et al. (2008), Boorman et al. (2009), Chib et al. (2009), De Martino et al. (2009), 
FitzGerald, Seymour, and Dolan (2009), Hare, Camerer, and Rangel (2009), Peters and Buchel (2009), 
Talmi et al. (2009), Basten et al. (2010), Hare et al. (2010), Plassmann, O’Doherty, and Rangel (2010), 
Prevost et al. (2010), Smith et al. (2010), Tusche, Bode, and Haynes (2010), Wunderlich, Rangel, and 
O’Doherty (2010), Hare, Malmaud, and Rangel (2011), Hare et al. (2011), Levy and Glimcher (2011), Lim, 
O’Doherty, and Rangel (2011), Litt et al. (2011), Park et al. (2011), Hutcherson et al. (2012), Janowski, 
Camerer, and Rangel (2012), Kahnt et al. (2012), Lin, Adolphs, and Rangel (2012), and Sokol-Hessner et 
al. (2012).  12	  See Rangel and Hare (2010), Grabenhorst and Rolls (2011), Wallis (2011), Levy and Glimcher (2012), 
Rangel and Clithero (forthcoming), and	  Rushworth et al. (2012).	  13	  Some fMRI studies that look for neural correlates of value at the time of choice have also found such 
correlations in areas like the posterior cingulate cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the insula, and the 
ventral striatrum. There are two important differences, however, between vmPFC activity and activity in 
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these other areas. First, activity in these other areas is correlated with decision values in some studies but 
not in others, whereas the vmPFC value signals are always present (the only exceptions are studies in 
which the scanning parameters are not optimized to carry out measurements in the vmPFC, a region that is 
especially difficult to image well). Second, the additional tests described above (which are needed to make 
sure that the signals are really decision values, and not correlated but distinct variables) have not been 
carried out in these other areas. As a result, the computational basis of these areas in the process of making 
a decision remains an open question.	  14	  We say that the value of holding a stock is “approximately” zero for a realization utility trader because, 
in principle, there is some value to holding, namely, an expected future realization utility flow. However, 
under the realization utility hypothesis, the trader is essentially myopic – he discounts future utility flows at 
a high rate. To a first approximation, then, the value of holding is zero. It may seem surprising that a 
subject would discount future utility at a high rate in the context of a 30-minute experiment. However, the 
literature on hyperbolic discounting suggests that discounting can be steep even over short intervals, 
perhaps because people distinguish sharply between rewards available right now and rewards available at 
all future times. Furthermore, what may be important in our experiment is not so much calendar time, as 
transaction time. A subject who can trade stock B now may view the opportunity to trade it in the future as 
a very distant event -- one that is potentially dozens of screens away – and hence one that he discounts 
heavily. Finally, we note that discounting is not an essential part of our hypothesis. The disposition effect 
also follows from a model with no time discounting but where realization utility has an S-shaped functional 
form, as in prospect theory. To a first approximation, this model leads to the same decision value as the 
discounting-based model. The reason is that, under an S-shaped utility function, the utility of selling a stock 
at a gain (loss) immediately is significantly higher (lower) than the expected utility of holding on to it. 
15 See, for example, Schultz, Dayan, and Montague (1997), McClure, Berns, and Montague (2003), 
O'Doherty et al. (2003), Bayer and Glimcher (2005), Pessiglione et al. (2006), Hare et al. (2008), Caplin et 
al. (2010), Glascher et al. (2010), Daw et al. (2011), and Lin, Adolphs, and Rangel (2012). 
16 The neural activity measured by fMRI in a 1 mm3 cube (about the size of a grain of salt) represents the 
joint activity of between 5,000 to 40,000 neurons, depending on the area of the brain. 
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17 More precisely, we acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. 
To optimize functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a key region of interest, we acquire the 
images in an oblique orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line (Deichmann 
et al. (2003)). Each volume of images has 45 axial slices. A total of 692 volumes were collected over two 
sessions. The imaging parameters are as follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane 
resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2.75 s. 
18 More precisely, we acquire high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 x 1 x 1 mm) for each subject. 
These are coregistered with their mean EPI images and averaged across subjects to permit anatomical 
localization of the functional activations at the group level. 
19 BOLD measurements were corrected for head motion by aligning them to the first full brain scan and 
normalizing to the Montreal Neurological Institute’s EPI template. This entails estimating a six-parameter 
model of head motion for each volume (three parameters for center movement, and three parameters for 
rotation), and then removing the effect of the motion using these parameters. For details, see Friston et al. 
(1996).	  
20 Spatial smoothing was performed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Essentially, 
this step entails replacing every measurement at every voxel with a weighted sum of the measurements in a 
neighborhood centered on the voxel, using weights that are given by the Gaussian kernel. 
21 Specifically, we applied a high-pass temporal filter to the BOLD data with a cut-off of 128 seconds.	  
22 For example, linear trends are often included as controls because the scanner heats up with continuous 
operation, inducing a linear change in the measured BOLD responses. 
23 Specifically, we report results as significant if voxels within the pre-specified region of interest pass 
p<0.001 uncorrected with a 15 voxel extent threshold and if they pass SVC with a family-wise error rate of 
less than 0.05.    
24 The vmPFC anatomical mask was identified using the AAL digital atlas of the human brain (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al. (2002)), and includes the rectus, the orbital part of the superior frontal gyrus, and the orbital 
part of the middle frontal gyrus. 
25 The vSt anatomical mask is taken from Chib et al. (2012), and is comprised of the nucleus accumbens 
and the ventral putamen.	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  26	  We also test for the possibility that, due to learning, the disposition effect decreases in size over time. 
We find that the mean disposition effect is smaller in the second half of the experiment compared to the 
first half (0.145 vs. 0.259, p=0.087, a reduction of 11.2% relative to the optimal level of -0.76), but that it is 
still positive and sizable in the second half (0.145 vs. the optimal level of -0.76, p<0.001). 27	  The low correlation between PGR and PLR is not inconsistent with realization utility; it simply suggests 
that realization utility is not the only factor driving subjects’ trading. For example, if our subjects are 
influenced to varying extents by realization utility but also differ in how much they enjoy trading in 
general, they may exhibit a near-zero correlation between PGR and PLR: the negative correlation between 
the two variables induced by realization utility may be offset by the positive correlation induced by the 
taste for trading. 28	  One natural question about our experiment is: How much of the realization utility effect that we have 
found depends on the fact that we display the original purchase price on the trading screen in a salient way? 
We emphasize that it is unlikely that the presence of a realization utility effect depends critically on this 
aspect of the design. In follow-up work, we have carried out behavioral experiments to study the impact of 
the saliency with which the purchase price information is displayed (Frydman and Rangel (2013)). We find 
that eliminating the purchase price from the trading screen diminishes the size of the disposition effect, but 
that the effect is still well above the optimal level that an expected value investor would exhibit. This 
suggests that reporting the purchase price on the trading screen is not a critical aspect of our current design. 
Moreover, given that most investors in real-world financial markets have at least a rough sense of the price 
at which they purchased a stock, displaying the cost basis on the trading screen is likely a better 
approximation of reality. 29	  At the same time, because our experimental design induces a negative correlation (equal to -0.55) 
between the capital gain and the NEV of selling, the fact that we report the purchase price also makes it 
easy for an expected value subject to trade in a way that is close to his optimal strategy, namely to hold a 
stock when it has a capital gain and to sell it when it has a capital loss. As a result, we do not think that 
presenting the purchase price on the trading screen should bias an expected value trader toward exhibiting a 
disposition effect.	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30 Since the computations that take place during the price update screens do not play a role in testing the 
realization utility model, we do not focus on them in the current study. However, we have analyzed the 
neural activity during the price update screens in a companion paper (Frydman, Camerer, and Rangel 
(2012)); in particular, we use these data to test regret-based models of investing. We find that activity in the 
ventral striatum correlates positively with price changes at the time of a price update for assets that are 
owned by the subject. Interestingly, the sign of this correlation reverses for assets that are not owned by the 
subject. 
31 We use the maximum statistic instead of the average statistic because of the heterogeneity in anatomical 
and functional structure of the vmPFC across subjects.  Since we are testing for a correlation, rather than 
for a particular mean value, using the maximum statistic will not bias our results. 
32 Before continuing with our test of Prediction 4, we further validate, using data from our own 28 subjects, 
that our a priori target region of the vSt is responsible for computing a prediction error signal. Specifically, 
we test whether news about a positive price change for an owned stock – an event that should induce a 
positive prediction error – is positively correlated with activity in our vSt target region. We can use the 
estimation results from equation (7) to test this hypothesis because the price change during the price update 
screen is included as a control in that model. The results indicate that voxels within the vSt target region do 
indeed exhibit positive correlation with the price change (p<0.05, whole-brain corrected FWE). This 
provides independent validation that our vSt target region computes a prediction error. 
33 We include the onset of the decision screen for capital loss trials only as a control variable in this model.   
34 The time-course of BOLD responses is based on a GLM specification that uses a series of dummy 
variables that correspond to our events of interest: holding a capital gain and selling a capital gain.  For 
each of these two events, x=hold and x=sell, and with additional controls for the onset of price update 
screens, buying opportunities, and capital loss trials, and for n=1,….,T, we define a series of dummy 
variables, 𝑑 𝑡|𝑥, 𝑛 = 1 if  𝑥  occurred  at  𝑡 − 𝑛0 otherwise .   The GLM is then specified as:   𝑏! 𝑡 = constant + 𝛾𝑥,𝑛𝑣 𝑑 𝑡 𝑥, 𝑛 +   𝛽1𝑣session +𝑥,𝑛 𝛽2𝑣movement + 𝜀 𝑡 . 
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The estimate of the change in the BOLD response n seconds after the presentation of stimulus x is then 
given by 𝛾!,!. “Session” and “movement” are control vectors for session-specific effects and physical 
movement inside the scanner, respectively.   	  35	  Our experimental design implies a high correlation between NEV and recent price changes. To check the 
robustness of our result to any collinearity issues, we also estimate the logistic regression without the NEV 
variable. We again find that the capital gain significantly predicts the sell decision, but that neither of the 
two most recent price changes does. 36	  While our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that mean-reverting beliefs are driving our subjects’ 
decisions, one can ask whether there are other non-Bayesian belief specifications that could explain the 
observed trading patterns (see, e.g., Kuhnen and Knutson (2011)). In Frydman and Rangel (2013), a 
companion behavioral paper, we shed some light on this issue. In that paper, we compare subjects’ trading 
behavior across a variety of treatments that differ only in the information shown on the trading screen. One 
of the treatments is the one used here. In another treatment, however, we also give subjects the NEV 
statistic on each trading screen; in other words, we effectively give them the correct Bayesian beliefs. As a 
result, if subjects persist in exhibiting a disposition effect, it is very difficult to attribute this to non-
Bayesian beliefs. We find that the addition of the NEV statistic decreases the size of the disposition effect 
that subjects exhibit, but that it nonetheless remains substantial. This suggests that at least some portion of 
the disposition effect that we find in the current study is not due to non-Bayesian beliefs.	  
37 Recall from Section II.C that, when computing the decision value of selling for a realization utility agent, 
we assume that he is fully myopic.  This means that he places zero value on holding the stock, so that the 
decision value simply equals the value of selling. If, instead, the agent does not fully discount the future, 
the value of holding will be nonzero, and the actual decision value of selling will be different  from what 
we specify. If there is more heterogeneity in the discount rate across subjects for losses than for gains, there 
will be a more severe misspecification in the decision value of selling a loss, compared to the decision 
value of selling a gain. 
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Experimental Instructions 	  
Buying	  your	  stock	  
	  In	  this	  experiment	  you	  will	  be	  given	  350	  experimental	  dollars	  to	  invest	  in	  three	  different	  stocks.	  	  Your	  job	  is	  to	  choose	  when	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  each	  stock,	  so	  that	  you	  earn	  the	  most	  money	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  Throughout	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  see	  the	  price	  of	  each	  stock	  changing	  (more	  detail	  below),	  and	  you	  will	  use	  this	  information	  to	  decide	  when	  to	  buy	  and	  sell.	  	  When	  you	  sell	  a	  stock,	  you	  receive	  an	  amount	  of	  cash	  equal	  to	  the	  price	  of	  the	  stock.	  	  When	  you	  buy	  a	  stock,	  you	  receive	  one	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  but	  you	  must	  give	  up	  an	  amount	  of	  cash	  equal	  to	  the	  current	  price	  of	  the	  stock.	  	  The	  three	  stocks	  you	  can	  buy	  or	  sell	  are	  simply	  called	  Stock	  A,	  Stock	  B,	  and	  Stock	  C.	  	  To	  begin	  the	  experiment	  you	  MUST	  buy	  all	  three	  stocks,	  where	  each	  stock	  costs	  $100.	  	  Therefore,	  after	  you	  buy	  the	  three	  stocks,	  you	  will	  own	  one	  unit	  of	  each	  stock	  and	  have	  a	  total	  of	  $50	  remaining.	  	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  hold	  a	  maximum	  of	  one	  unit	  of	  each	  stock,	  and	  you	  cannot	  hold	  negative	  units	  (no	  short	  selling.)	  	  However,	  you	  can	  carry	  a	  negative	  cash	  balance	  by	  buying	  a	  stock	  for	  more	  money	  than	  you	  have,	  but	  any	  negative	  cash	  balances	  will	  be	  deducted	  from	  your	  final	  earnings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Structure	  of	  the	  market	  
	  In	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  see	  two	  types	  of	  screens,	  a	  price	  update	  screen	  and	  an	  
action	  screen.	  	  In	  the	  price	  update	  screen,	  one	  stock	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  and	  you	  will	  be	  told	  if	  the	  selected	  stock	  price	  has	  gone	  up	  or	  down,	  and	  by	  how	  much.	  	  Note	  that	  you	  will	  only	  see	  an	  update	  for	  one	  stock	  at	  a	  time.	  	  You	  will	  not	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  anything	  during	  this	  screen;	  you	  will	  simply	  see	  information	  about	  the	  change	  in	  price.	  	  Following	  the	  price	  update	  screen,	  another	  stock	  will	  be	  randomly	  chosen	  (it	  may	  be	  the	  same	  one	  you	  just	  saw)	  and	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  take	  an	  action.	  	  If	  you	  currently	  hold	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  if	  you	  would	  like	  to	  sell	  the	  stock	  at	  the	  current	  price.	  	  If	  you	  do	  not	  currently	  own	  a	  unit	  of	  the	  stock,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  if	  you	  would	  like	  to	  buy	  a	  unit	  at	  the	  current	  price.	  	  	  	  The	  experiment	  will	  start	  out	  with	  nine	  consecutive	  price	  update	  screens;	  you	  will	  then	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  or	  sell	  after	  each	  subsequent	  price	  update	  screen.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
How	  the	  stock	  prices	  change	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  Each	  stock	  changes	  price	  according	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  rule.	  	  Each	  stock	  is	  either	  in	  a	  good	  state	  or	  in	  a	  bad	  state.	  	  In	  the	  good	  state,	  the	  stock	  goes	  up	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  it	  goes	  down	  with	  45%	  chance.	  	  In	  the	  bad	  state,	  the	  stock	  goes	  down	  with	  55%	  chance	  and	  it	  goes	  up	  with	  45%	  chance.	  	  	  	  Once	  it	  is	  determined	  whether	  the	  price	  will	  go	  up	  or	  down,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  change	  is	  always	  random,	  and	  will	  either	  be	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  bad	  state,	  the	  stock	  will	  go	  down	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  the	  amount	  it	  goes	  down	  by	  is	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15	  with	  equal	  chance.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  good	  stock	  will	  go	  up	  with	  55%	  chance,	  and	  the	  amount	  it	  goes	  up	  by	  will	  either	  be	  $5,	  $10,	  or	  $15.	  	  	  	  The	  stocks	  will	  all	  randomly	  start	  in	  either	  the	  good	  state	  or	  bad	  state,	  and	  after	  each	  price	  update,	  there	  is	  a	  20%	  chance	  the	  stock	  switches	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stock	  price	  changes	  	   Good	  state	   Bad	  state	  
+	  	   55%	   45%	  
-­‐	  	  	   45%	   55%	  	  	  
State	  changes	  	   Good	  state	  today	   Bad	  state	  today	  
Good	  state	  tomorrow	   80%	   20%	  
Bad	  state	  tomorrow	   20%	   80%	  	  	  	  
Earnings	  and	  payout	  
	  You	  will	  play	  this	  market	  game	  TWO	  SEPARATE	  TIMES	  in	  the	  scanner.	  	  Each	  game	  will	  last	  approximately	  15	  minutes,	  and	  each	  game	  is	  independent	  from	  the	  previous	  one.	  	  This	  means	  that	  when	  you	  start	  the	  second	  game,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  buy	  the	  three	  stocks	  at	  $100	  again,	  and	  the	  stocks	  will	  start	  randomly	  in	  each	  state	  again.	  	  	  	  Your	  earnings	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  you	  accrued	  over	  the	  two	  scanning	  sessions	  from	  buying	  and	  selling	  stocks,	  plus	  the	  current	  price	  of	  any	  stocks	  that	  you	  own.	  	  	  	  
Earnings=cash	  +	  	  	  price	  A*(Hold	  A)	  	  	  	  +	  	  	  	  Price	  	  B*(Hold	  B)	  	  	  	  +	  	  	  	  Price	  C*(Hold	  C)	  
	  
	  Finally,	  your	  earnings	  will	  be	  converted	  using	  an	  exchange	  rate	  of	  12:1.	  	  That	  means	  we	  divide	  your	  earnings	  by	  12,	  and	  pay	  you	  this	  amount	  plus	  the	  $15	  show	  up	  fee.	  	  	  
	  
	   4	  
Button	  presses	  	  During	  the	  Action	  screens,	  you	  will	  either	  be	  given	  the	  option	  to	  “Buy?”	  or	  “Sell?”	  depending	  on	  whether	  you	  hold	  the	  stock	  or	  not.	  	  The	  LEFT	  (blue)	  button	  indicates	  “YES”.	  	  And	  the	  RIGHT	  (yellow)	  button	  indicates	  “NO.”	  	  You	  have	  three	  seconds	  to	  enter	  your	  response,	  otherwise	  the	  computer	  will	  randomly	  select	  a	  response	  for	  you.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  
